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Does Risk Aversion Make
a Case for Conservatism?*
Ralph M. Perhac, Jr.**
Introduction
Conservatism is widely advocated and employed in risk assessment,
and because risk assessment plays an ever-increasing role in
environmental policy, it stands to have a profound effect on
environmental policy and on the allocation of scarce resources. Despite
its prevalence, the use of conservatism in risk assessment is controversial.
It has been variously argued that conservatism is at odds with rational
(i.e., expected-value) decision-making, distorts resource allocation and
the pattern of regulation, and conflates risk assessment and risk
management - and that the cumulative effect of conservative
assumptions (even if individually acceptable) is an unacceptable level of
conservatism. 1
* I thank Milton Russell and Mary English whose comments on an earlier draft
were very helpful. I also thank anonymous reviewers who obviously put a great deal
of thought and effort into their comments. Of course, remaining inadequacies in this
paper are solely attributable to myself.
** Dr. Perhac is a Research Associate in the Energy, Environment and Resources
Center, University of Tennessee, Knoxville. He received his B.A. (Economics) and
M.B.A. from the University of Tennessee and his Ph.D. (Philosophy) from The
University of Minnesota.
1 See, e.g., Daniel L. Maxim, Problems Associated with the Use of Conservative
Assumptions in Exposure and Risk Analysis, in The Risk Assessment of
Environmental and Human Health Hazards: A Text Book of Case Studies 526
(Dennis J. Paustenbach, ed. 1989); Bernard Goldstein, The Problem with the Margin
of Safety: Toward the Concept of Protection, 10 RiskAnal. 7 (1990); Albert Nichols
& Richard Zeckhauser, The Perils of Prudence, Regulation, Dec. 1986, at 13; Albert
Nichols & Richard Zeckhauser, The Dangers of Caution: Conservatism in
Assessment and the Mismanagement of Risk, in Advances in Applied Micro-
Economics (V. Kerry Smith, ed. 1986); W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and
Private Responsibilities for Risk 157 (1992); Vincent T. Covello & Miley Merkhofer,
Risk Assessment Methods: Approaches for Assessing Health and Environmental Risks
263 (1993); Chris Whipple, Nonpessimistic Risk Assessment and de Minimis Risk as
Risk Management Tools, in The Risk Assessment of Environmental and Human
Health Hazards.... supra, 1105.
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A variety of arguments for conservatism exists. 2 Arguably the
most important one proceeds from the premise that it is better to be
safe with regard to human health and life than sorry. My concern does
not lie with the wisdom of the premise itself but rather with the chain
of reasoning that ostensibly leads from there to the conclusion that
conservatism is advisable. Rarely, if ever, has this chain been subject to
careful analysis. 3 If it should involve invalid inferences or conceptual
flaws, a very powerful argument confronts advocates of conservatism -
one that depends, not upon juxtaposing one set of value judgments
against another, but upon logical and conceptual analysis. Further, any
flaws which turn up affect very modest as well as extreme conservatism.
My aim is not, however, just to identify logical and conceptual
flaws. It is to determine precisely what the case must be for this
argument to go through. In fact, under restrictive conditions, a valid
argument for conservatism can be made on the basis that it is better to
be safe than sorry (validity concerns the chain of reasoning, but not the
truth of the premises). A focus on logical structure means that I will not
question any value judgments that might figure into the premises of the
argument for conservatism, other than insisting on conceptual clarity.
As important as these value judgments may be, a great deal can be
gained simply from a clear understanding of the logical structure of an
argument, the meaning of premises, and an understanding of what can
and cannot be inferred from what. Too often debates about
conservatism miss the mark precisely because of the lack of a clear
understanding of these matters. Hence, I try to lay the logical and
conceptual groundwork for more fruitful discussions of the merits of
conservatism in risk assessment.
2 Adam M. Finkel, Has Risk Assessment Become Too "Conservative"? in
Resources, Summer 1989, at 11 Adam M. Finkel, Is Risk Assessment Really Too
Conservative? Revising the Revisionists, 14 Colum. J. Env'1 L. 427 (1989); Adam M.
Finkel, The Case for "Plausible Conservatism" in Choosing and Altering Defaults, in
National Research Council, Science and Judgment in RiskAssessment N-1-3 (1994).
3 An analysis of this sort is only hinted at in Nichols & Zeckhauser, supra note 2,
Perils of Prudence, at 22.
Perhac: Risk Aversion and the Case for Conservatism 299
Conservatism Defined
Conservatism involves a preference for erring on the side of
overstating as opposed to understating risk under conditions of
uncertainty. This preference is manifested in the use of risk estimates
that exceed the mean (average) value of the probability distribution of
the risk in question. The mean value, of course, is a measure of central
tendency which (over repeated outcomes) tends neither to overstate or
understate risk. Where a probability distribution is known, conservatism
might involve selecting a risk estimate at the, say, 95th percentile -
meaning there is a 95% chance that the actual risk4 is overestimated
and only a 5% chance that it is underestimated. 5
It should be noted that I speak here of conservatism in the selection
of risk estimates as shorthand for conservatism that can, and often does,
enter the estimation of risk at numerous points by way of a variety of
assumptions and parameters, not simply in the final selection of an
estimate. Conservatism may enter the process in the selection of.6
1. Initial contaminant concentrations.
2. Physicochemical constants to describe the kinetics of
contaminant transport.
3. Exposure frequency of humans to contaminants...
4. Human contact (uptake) rates...for alternative exposure
pathways.
5. Bioavailability fractions (e.g., absorption rates through
the skin).
6. Dose-response parameters and models.
4 Adam Finkel has suggested that the notion of "actual risk" is a pervasive
misconception that contributes to misguided attacks on conservatism. Risk, he argues,
is a fundamentally probabilistic notion, whereby the demand for actual risk estimates
makes no sense; Colum. J. Env'l L., supra note 2, at 432.
But no one attacks conservatism because of the stochastic nature of the estimates
it produces. Actual risk simply refers to the best possible characterization of a
stochastic phenomena. Even advocates of conservatism are implicitly committed to
the notion of actual risk, as their preference for erring on the side of overstating risk
implies a point of reference, namely actual risk.
5 It is possible that in a very skewed distribution the 95th percentile is also the
mean, in which case the 95th percentile would not count as a conservative estimate as I
am using the term. Of course, when proponents of conservatism advocate the use of
the 95th percentile estimate, it is not in the belief or hope that it is the mean. They are
fully prepared to overstate the mean estimate of risk.
6 Maxim, supra note 1, at 532.
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Risk Aversion and Empirical Asymmetries
The premise that it is better to be safe than sorry implies risk
aversion, which involves a willingness to accept benefits that are lower
on average (or incur costs that are higher on average) in order to avoid a
gamble involving a potential loss. Conservatism is seen as a way to
protect against losses that could result from "gambling" about the true
level of risk; it might turn out to be higher than expected.
Despite the assumption of guarding against losses, a preference for
overstating risk (conservatism) does not protect against losses more than
does a preference for understating risk. Overstating (mean) risk only
protects against losses (in human life) that would occur if risk is greater
than the mean. It does not protect against losses (from unnecessary risk
reduction expenditures) that would occur if risk is less than the mean.
In order to protect against the latter, a case for understating risk exists.
Which is to say, risk aversion, in and of itself, could just as well support
understating risk as overstating it. Hence, one cannot logically infer a
case for conservatism simply from an aversion to risk.
If one is going to make a case for conservatism on the basis of risk
aversion, one must establish the existence of an asymmetry between the
cases for overstating and understating risk. This might be attempted in
either of two ways. One involves an appeal to empirical considerations.
The other involves an appeal to value judgments.
On the empirical side, a case for overstating (mean) risk would
exist, granting the wisdom of risk aversion, if risk parameters and risk
are distributed asymmetrically about the mean - more specifically, if
they are skewed to the high side of the mean. Under these conditions,
risk aversion is better served by overstating, as opposed to understating,
mean risk, because a greater potential for losses exists if risk is
underestimated.
Of course, if risk is skewed the other way, a case for understating
mean risk exists. The fact that advocates of conservatism never advocate
understating mean risk in deference to risk aversion suggests that either
(1) they believe that environmental risks and risk parameters are always
skewed to the high side of the mean (which is highly unlikely), or (2)
they do not rest their case on these empirical considerations, despite the
fact that, as we shall see, they provide the only viable case for
conservatism. It is incumbent, then, upon advocates of conservatism to
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provide empirical evidence of the skewed distribution of risk and risk
parameters about the mean in support of their advocacy - something
which they have largely failed to do and may be unable to do in the
case of many risks and risk parameters.
Risk Aversion and Asymmetries in Values
The second approach to establishing an asymmetry lies in arguing
for a qualitative difference between the losses that one protects against
by overstating risk versus those that one protects against by
understating it (even if risk is symmetrically distributed). Then we
might have reason to protect against one as opposed to the other. To
this end, one might maintain that protecting against loss of life is more
important than protecting against pecuniary losses. Certainly, this idea
has an intuitive appeal. Yet, this surely does not mean that saving lives is
categorically more important than saving money, i.e., that saving a
(statistical) life is worth any cost. No one believes that.
Obviously there are asymmetries and qualitative differences of
various sorts between lives and dollars (after all, one is a biological
phenomenon and the other is not).7 The real question is whether
these differences preclude establishing terms for the trade-off between
the two. Despite qualitative differences, people must and do make
trade-offs between lives and dollars. This fact is sufficient for the
purposes of the present argument, which seeks only to establish that at
whatever level people (society) make these trade-offs, as they must, we
can assume they are neutral between the two; otherwise they would not
seek trade-offs at that level. Furthermore, any attempt to alter the
terms of the trade-off by way of conservatism is simply to acknowledge
that we did not have the terms of the trade-off right to begin with,
which is easily enough (and more directly and transparently) remedied
without invoking conservatism.
7 An example of the sort of qualitative difference that might be invoked in an effort
to establish an asymmetry is provided by an anonymous reviewer who questioned the
symmetry between lives lost and dollars lost on the basis that the former, unlike the
latter, are irreversible. However, any such irreversibility does not stand in the way of
placing a dollar value on life-saving measures; it is taken account of in the dollar value
placed on the (irreversible) loss of a life. Further, dollars spent unwisely in risk
remediation measures are themselves irretrievable.
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Once one recognizes the untenability of the premise that human
health and life are simply more important than monetary
considerations, and thereby accepts the commensurability of lives and
dollars in the context of resource allocations, a symmetry between the
costs of overstating and understating risk is established (assuming a
symmetric distribution of risks). And given this symmetry, the risk
averse individual (or society) has no reason to favor errors of overstating
as opposed to understating risk. Hence, the argument from risk
,aversion to the advocacy of conservatism fails to go through.
Consider the cost of overstating and understating risk by a given
amount, say, ten lives. The cost of underestimating risk by ten deaths
could range from zero up to the value of the ten lives which might be
lost for failure to eliminate the risk in question. If the value of a
statistical life is $1 million, then the cost of underestimation could
range from zero to $10 million. By comparison, the cost of
overestimating risk by ten deaths could range from zero up to the costs
incurred in order to avert those ten, erroneously suspected, deaths.
Given that ten lives are worth $10 million, we might reasonably spend
up to $10 million to eliminate the suspected risk. Hence, the cost of
overestimating risk could range from zero to $10 million dollars,
precisely the same range associated with underestimating risk. While
this symmetry involves a range rather than a specific value, there is no
reason to think that the costs of understating risk would be
systematically higher within this range. It is also important to note that
this symmetry remains no matter high one sets the value of a
(statistical) life.
Despite this analysis, one still may be tempted by the claim that it
is better at the margin (where one dollar either way makes or breaks the
case for an incremental life-saving expenditure) to err in spending one
dollar too much to save a life than to err in losing a life for failure to
spend that extra dollar. Yet, the previous analysis simply belies this
claim. In either case, the error results in a loss that is equivalent to one
dollar. In the first instance, we spend one dollar more than the
incremental life saved is worth, which results in a net loss of one dollar.
In the second, the expenditure we fail to make would have bought an
incremental life, which, at the margin, would have been worth one
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dollar more than the required expenditure, implying - once again - a
net loss of one dollar. A refusal to accept the implications of this
analysis can only be construed as a refusal to accept the
commensurability of lives and dollars, but given that no one denies that
a limit must be placed on life-saving measures, this refusal smacks of
logical inconsistency.
The symmetry between the costs of understating and overstating
mean risk does not, in and of itself, argue for the use of mean estimates
of risk. Any argumen t to that end must grapple with the wisdom (or
lack thereof) of risk aversion, an issue that I do not address here. The
above considerations simply imply that from risk aversion one cannot
infer the preferability of overstating, as opposed to understating, mean
risk (given a symmetrical distribution of risk about the mean).
Conclusion
A preference for erring on the side of overstating as opposed to
understating risk under conditions of uncertainty can be logically
inferred from an aversion to risk only on condition that the distribution
of risk (and risk parameters) is skewed to the high side of the mean.
Perhaps for failure to recognize this fact, advocates of conservatism have
made little effort to produce empirical evidence for this. Rather, they
seem to rely upon the intuitive appeal of risk aversion in conjunction
with a stated preference for saving lives over money at the margin. Yet,
one cannot logically infer the advisability of conservatism from these
premises. From an aversion to risk alone, one cannot infer the
advisability of conservatism, because there are risks associated with both
overstating and understating risk. The addition of the premise that
saving lives is more important than saving money is still inadequate to
establish the desired conclusion. An absolute preference for the former
is untenable (all would agree) and any preference short of this means
that the two are commensurable, which in turn means that there is no
reason to favor one as opposed to the other, given appropriate terms for
the trade-off between the two.
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